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Take On Payments, a blog sponsored by the Retail Payments Risk Forum of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, is intended to foster dialogue on emerging risks in retail payment systems and enhance collaborative efforts to improve risk detection and mitigation. We encourage your active participation in Take on Payments and look forward to collaborating with you.

Take On Payments

March 26, 2018


Convenience Always Wins, In One Form or Another

My colleagues and I often write about the frustration that security professionals have that consumer convenience will almost always win over the adoption of more secure practices. We've seen this over the decades with poor password and PIN management and the often lackadaisical approach consumers take to keeping their payment devices safe and secure. This post will take a slightly different tack—it will explore the influence convenience has on the payment card issuance strategy of U.S. financial institutions (FI) and how convenience always seems to win, though sometimes in unexpected ways.

When the various mobile pay wallets were being launched, many observers speculated that they might be the beginning of the end for plastic payment cards. Some, presuming that mobile was a more convenient way to pay, opined that the day would come when FIs would have no reason to continue issuing cards since everyone was going to be using their phones. Although adoption has been increasing, the reality is that mobile payments at the point of sale have been slow to gain traction. Recently released results of a survey of FIs in seven of the Federal Reserve Bank districts revealed that 75 percent of respondents thought it would be at least three years before consumer adoption rates of mobile payments would exceed 50 percent; 40 percent said it would take five years or longer. Consumer surveys consistently indicate that consumers aren't adopting mobile payments because they find their plastic payment card more convenient. So for mobile devices, convenience still has a ways to go.

Some financial-institution-owned ATM operators, continuing efforts to provide alternatives to plastic cards, have recently begun supporting cardless ATM transactions. With this service, you use your FI's mobile banking application to set up or stage an ATM withdrawal, identifying the account and amount to be dispensed. The details of the various technologies differ, but they all work like this: you go to the FI's ATM, select the cardless ATM function, and use a smartphone to either scan a QR bar code or enter a one-time transaction code. (Sometimes you may have to use a PIN.) Nice and convenient! And you don't have to worry about damaged or forgotten cards, or getting your card skimmed. We'll have to wait to see how consumers react to this feature's convenience.

Some FIs currently issue, or plan to issue, dual interface cards when it's time for customers to replace their existing chip card. While costlier to the FI, the new cards include a contactless feature that allows an NFC-enabled terminal such as an ATM or point-of-service device to read the data on the chip when you pass the card within a couple of inches of the reader. Contactless transactions, which are quite popular in Canada and Europe and greatly desired by mass transit systems in the United States, are faster. And we all know that faster means more convenience—right? Like cardless ATM transactions, contactless offers some security benefits. But merchant terminal acceptance remains a concern, just as it has been for the various pay wallet applications.

So it seems that convenience comes in different forms, and it appears that many FIs are betting that, like currency and checks, the plastic payment card is going to be around for quite some time. Perhaps that is the best strategy: offer a wide range of options and let the customers decide for themselves which are the most convenient.

Photo of David Lott By David Lott, a payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed

March 26, 2018 in cards, debit cards, mobile banking, mobile payments | Permalink

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March 19, 2018


Mobile Banking and Payments' Weakest Link: Me

What's the biggest hole in mobile banking security? As my colleague Dave Lott reported in January, bankers say it's consumers' lack of protective behavior when using mobile devices. That means you and me.

In response, financial institutions (FI) have implemented controls including inactivity timeouts and multifactor authentication, as noted in Mobile Banking and Payment Practices of U.S. Financial Institutions, which reported the findings of a 2016 Federal Reserve survey.

Baking these controls into mobile apps makes sense because research on consumer behavior suggests that expecting consumers to independently take steps to protect their accounts and data is not realistic. Take as one example: I co-wrote a paper with Joanna Stavins for the Boston Fed reporting the results of our investigation into consumers' responses to the massive Target data breach. We found that while consumers do react to reports of fraud, their reactions can be short-lived. In addition, consumers' opinions may change, but their behavior may not. In other words, considerations aside from security could take priority. (See also a report on the 2012 South Carolina Department of Revenue breach.)

Debit and credit card data for 40 million cards used in Target stores were stolen in late 2013. The breach was widely reported in the news media and caused many financial institutions to reissue cards. Because it was primarily a debit card breach, one might reasonably expect consumers to take a jaundiced view of debit cards after the breach.

And, indeed, that was the case. The Survey of Consumer Payment Choice was in the field at the time of the Target breach. Some consumers answered questions about the security of debit cards before the breach became public. Others answered after.

Consumers who rated card security after the breach rated debit cards more poorly relative to the average rating of the other payment instruments—cash, paper checks, ACH methods, prepaid cards, and credit cards. So in that sense, they reacted to the news.

One year later, consumers in 2014 rated the security of debit cards more poorly both relative to their ratings of other payment instruments and absolutely (that is, a greater percentage of consumers rated debit cards as risky or very risky). In contrast, compared to 2013, the absolute security ratings of cash improved. There was no change in the security ratings of credit cards.

The more important question: Did consumers change their behavior in response to this massive and widely reported data breach? The answer: not according to this survey data. There was no statistically significant change in consumers' method of payment mix in 2014. Debit cards remained the most popular payment instrument among consumers in 2014, accounting for almost one-third of their payments per month.

What does this mean for financial institutions? Realism about my willingness to take action is well placed. You can't count on me.

Photo of Claire Greene By Claire Greene, a payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed

March 19, 2018 in account takeovers, banks and banking, cards, debit cards, identity theft, mobile banking, mobile payments | Permalink

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February 12, 2018


If the Password Is Dying, Is the PIN Far Behind?

Back in January, I wrote a post that highlighted the rising incidence of lost-and-stolen card fraud in the United Kingdom. I concluded that the decades-old PIN solution for the card-present environment is now showing signs of weakness. Results of a recent Minneapolis Fed survey of 283 financial institutions offer some validity to my conclusion: the survey found that losses on PIN-based debit increased by 50 percent from 2015 to 2016. In fact, 81 percent of the respondents reported fraud losses from PIN-based debit, compared to only 77 percent for credit cards.

The news wasn't all bad for PIN-based debit. Signature-based debit and credit cards still had more fraud attempts than any other payment instrument. At 63 percent, signature debit fraud actually had a higher increase in fraud losses from 2015 to 2016 than did PIN debit. The PIN is a far superior verification method for card payments, but I'm willing to bet that the PIN, much like the password, has become less effective.

Is this coming at a time when the PIN is about to become more prominent? In late January, the PCI Security Standards Council announced a new security standard for software-based PIN entry, also known as "PIN on glass." This standard specifies the security requirements for accepting a PIN on a mobile point-of-sale device such as a Square card reader.

As an aside, I am a bit surprised by this announcement. Apparently, mobile phones are safe enough for entering PINs, but when someone uses a pay wallet such as Apple Pay or Samsung Pay, the card's PAN, or primary account number, is tokenized for security purposes. I'll save a discussion of this inconsistency for another post.

People have been talking for years now about how the password has passed its prime as a standalone authentication solution. Yet it continues to live, and it's as difficult as ever to mitigate its vulnerabilities. In my opinion, attempts to do so have increased customer friction and had minimal impact. I think the PIN is following a similar path. It creates customer friction (especially for me as I now have different PINs for multiple cards that I struggle to keep straight) and is losing its effectiveness, according to the data I mentioned in the first paragraph. But it appears that, with the PCI's recent announcement, the PIN could become even more prevalent for cardholders. Is it time, in the name of security and customer friction, for us to replace PINs and passwords with more modern authentication technologies such as biometrics?

Photo of Douglas King By Douglas A. King, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed

 

February 12, 2018 in authentication, banks and banking, cards, chip-and-pin, consumer fraud, debit cards, EMV, mobile payments | Permalink

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January 16, 2018


Not Just a Card-Not-Present Problem

In 2012, I published a paper that looked at trends in card fraud in several countries that had adopted or were in the later stages of adopting EMV chip cards. The United States is now in the process of adopting EMV, so I am refreshing that paper with an eye towards fraud trends in what are now mature EMV markets. Payments experts know that card-not-present (CNP) fraud will continue to pose challenges that EMV chip cards do not solve, but are there other challenges lurking in these markets that the U.S. payments industry should note?

Although I'm still gathering data, one particular data point from the United Kingdom—lost and stolen fraud—already has me intrigued. In 2016, losses from this type of fraud stood at more than £96 million (about $130 million), up from more than £44 million (about $60 million) in 2010, a 117 percent increase. In 2010, lost and stolen fraud accounted for 12 percent of overall card fraud in that country. By the end of 2016, it had become 16 percent of card fraud. It is now the second leading type of fraud in the United Kingdom, though it still falls far behind CNP fraud, which accounts for 70 percent.

Remember that in the United Kingdom, PIN usage was adopted to mitigate lost and stolen card fraud at the same time that EMV chip cards were implemented. Yet lost and stolen card fraud is up significantly. According to Financial Fraud Action UK, fraudsters are getting their hands on the PINs—a static data element—through distraction tactics and scams. Other factors, such as the proliferation of contactless transactions and those that have no cardholder verification method, could also be drivers of this fraud, as could an increase of reports of lost or stolen fraud that is actually first-party, or "friendly," fraud. EMV has proven to be an effective tool to authenticate cards, but authenticating an individual using a card, even in a card-present environment, remains a challenge.

The lost and stolen fraud figures out of the United Kingdom lead me to believe that cardholder authentication isn't just a CNP problem. Furthermore, the decades-old PIN solution for the card-present environment is now showing signs of weakness. At the same time, to reduce customer friction, many card networks are eliminating signature verification and relying on data analytics to authenticate transactions. Is this a perfect storm for lost and stolen card fraud? Is it the foreshadowing of the emergence of biometrics, or some lesser known technology? Or will I find that this problem is isolated and should not worry us in the United States?

Photo of Douglas King By Douglas A. King, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed

 

January 16, 2018 in authentication, cards, chip-and-pin, debit cards, EMV, fraud, payments | Permalink

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August 14, 2017


Extra! Extra! Triennial Payments Data Available in Excel!

In countless old black-and-white movies, street newspaper vendors would shout out the latest sensational news from hot-off-the-press special editions. The Fed is no different in that we want to shout out that it is no longer necessary to mine the PDF-based Federal Reserve Payments Study report to extract the study's data. For the first time, we are offering our entire aggregated data set of estimated noncash payments in an Excel file. The report accompanying the data is here.

The data set is very rich and covers the following categories:

Accounts and cards
Private-label credit processors
Checks Person-to-person and money transfer
ACH Online bill pay
Non-prepaid debit Walk-in bill pay
General-purpose prepaid Private-label ACH debit
Private-label prepaid issuers & processors Online payment authentication
General-purpose credit Mobile wallet
Private-label credit merchant issuers  

Here is another table that is just one extract from the non-prepaid debit card portion of the extensive payments data available.

To get a taste of what this data can teach us, let's look closer at the cumulative volume distribution by payment dollar value threshold for non-prepaid debit cards (the data are shown above) along with general-purpose credit cards. The number and value of both types of payments grew substantially from 2012 to 2015, the last two survey periods. The chart compares these distributions, showing more vividly how this growth affected the relative proportions of payments of different dollar values.

Chart-two

For example, debit card payments below $25 accounted for 59.1 percent of all payments in 2012 versus 61.8 percent in 2015—evidence that debit card purchases are migrating to lower ticket amounts. The trend is even more dramatic over the same time span for general-purpose credit cards.

Because this is a distribution, increases in the relative number of small-value payments must be offset by decreases in the relative number of large-value payments. Unfortunately, our previous survey capped the payment threshold at $50 in 2012. Otherwise, we would see the dashed 2012 lines crossing over the solid 2015 lines at some payment value threshold above $50. In brief, the results suggest cash payments are continuing to migrate to debit cards, while credit cards may be garnering some share at the expense of both cash and debit cards.

The challenge is on for you data analysts out there. Please share your findings.

Photo of Steven Cordray  By Steven Cordray, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk  Forum at the Atlanta Fed

August 14, 2017 in ACH, cards, checks, debit cards, mobile payments, payments study | Permalink

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June 19, 2017


Calculating Fraud: Part 2

Part 1 of this two-part series outlined an approach for whittling down credit card transactions to the value or number of authorized and settled payments as the denominator for calculating a fraud rate. This post reviews the elements needed to quantify the numerator.

To summarize from the previous post, when analyzing credit card fraud rates, you should consider what is being measured and compared. To calculate a fraud rate based on value or number, you need a fraud tally in the numerator and a comparison payment tally in the denominator. The formula works out as follows:

Fraud Rate = Numerator
                      Denominator

Where, for any given period of time
Numerator = Value, or number of fraudulent payments across the payments under consideration,
Denominator = Value, or number of payments under consideration.

Before calculating the numerator value, you must first decide what types of fraud to include in the measurement. One stratification method divides fraud into the following two categories:

  • First-party payments fraud results when a dishonest but seemingly legitimate consumer exploits a merchant or financial institution (FI). That is, the legitimate cardholder authorizes a credit card transaction as part of a scam. One manifestation of this is "friendly fraud," whereby a consumer purchases items online and then falsely claims not to receive the merchandise.
  • Third-party payments fraud occurs when a legitimate cardholder does not authorize goods or services purchased with his or her credit card. Besides the victimized cardholder, the other two parties to the transaction are the fraudster and the unsuspecting merchant or FI.

Sometimes no clear delineation between first-party and third-party fraud exists. For example, a valid cardholder may authorize a payment in collusion with a merchant to commit fraud.

The 2016 Federal Reserve Payments Study used only third-party unauthorized transactions that were cleared and settled in tabulating fraud. The study measured and counted fraud as having occurred regardless of whether a subsequent recovery or chargeback occurred. Survey results had to be adjusted because some card networks report gross fraud while others report net fraud, after recoveries and chargebacks. Furthermore, the study made no effort to determine which party, if any, in the payment chain may ultimately bear the loss. Finally, the study did not measure attempted fraud.

Excluding first-party payments fraud
The study excluded first-party fraud due to the greater ambiguity around identifying and measuring it along with the idea that it is difficult to eliminate, given that controls are relatively limited. One control option would be to place repeat offenders on a negative list that, unfortunately, might not be shared with other parties. As a result of excluding first-party fraud, the study focused on fraud specific to the characteristics of the payment instrument being used.

Paraphrasing from page 30 of the 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study, first-party fraud, while important, is an account-relationship type of fraud and typically would not be included as unauthorized third-party payments fraud because the card or account holder is by definition authorized to make payments. Consequently, first-party fraud can occur no matter how secure the payment method.

As with tallying payments, you could follow a similar process for tallying fraudulent payments for other types of cards payments, with more questionnaire definitions and wording changes needed for other instruments such as ACH and checks.

Photo of Steven Cordray  By Steven Cordray, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk  Forum at the Atlanta Fed

June 19, 2017 in ACH, cards, checks, debit cards, fraud | Permalink

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May 15, 2017


What Canada Knows That We Don't

In a previous post, I made reference to the pending release of a Bank of Canada study on the costs of point-of-sale payments in Canada. Last month, the study was released. This study covers cash as well as debit and credit card payments. It's a fascinating read that highlights what little comprehensive knowledge we have about comparable costs of payments in the United States.

The scope of the study was limited to the following parties in the payment chain:

  • Bank of Canada and Royal Canadian Mint (prints and distributes currency)
  • Financial institutions (FIs) and infrastructure providers (includes cash transport companies, payment networks and payment card acquirers)
  • Retailers (covers retail trade, accommodation, food services, and personal service providers)
  • Consumers

As background, the study categorizes costs of payments from the parties above into social (or resource) and private costs. Social costs include all internal and outsourced costs to parties outside the scope of the study. Excluded are transfer fees paid among parties within the scope of the study (for example, fees paid by retailers to FIs serving as card acquirers). This exclusion avoids overstating total social costs since fees paid to one party in the payments chain are revenue to another party in the payments chain. With this adjustment, aggregating social costs across all parties reflects the total resources expended for the entire country to facilitate payments. True or private costing from a particular party in the payment chain is simply the sum of its social costs plus any transfer fees paid to other parties within the scope of the study. Knowing private costs provides insight into which payment instruments are preferred from a costing perspective.

Here are some selected highlights from the study:

  • Total annual social costs clocked in at 15.3 billion (Can$), which comprises 0.78 percent of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP). In comparison, a paper from the Kansas City Fed highlights GDP figures ranging from 0.5 percent to 0.9 percent for other developed countries. Unfortunately, no comparable comprehensive study has been conducted in the United States. Using indirect approaches based on assumptions, some sources have estimated that the cost of the payments system in the United States could be as high as 2 percent of GDP. Unfortunately, we don't have any definitive sources on what the figure really is.
  • Below are the average social costs, transfer fees, and private costs (that is, sum of social costs and transfer fees) per transaction across the payment chain (in Can¢) by payment instrument.

    Table-one


    We can see that transfer fees among the parties in the payments chain are relatively minimal for cash. Consumers proportionally pay higher transfer fees for debit card payments due to transaction fees paid to FIs. Transfer fees that retailers pay are proportionally high for debit cards and significantly higher for credit cards. Based on private costs alone, credit cards costs are less costly to consumers, while retailers incur the highest cost in accepting credit cards. These findings are generally consistent with studies conducted in other countries.
  • Lastly, the study further subdivides costs into fixed costs and variable costs based on the number of payments and by the value of payments. Along with the number and value of payments, costing components in Canadian dollars are itemized below:

    Table-two


    The proportion of variable costs to overall costs for cash, debit cards and credit cards comprise 55 percent, 64 percent, and 64 percent, respectively.

Because of the central and significant role payments play in any economy, many current payments policy questions circulate around payments—in particular the costs associated with adopting and accepting various payment methods, fraud experience and prevention, and compliance with security standards and requirements. What are your views on the value of a comprehensive cost survey in this country?

Photo of Steven Cordray  By Steven Cordray, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk  Forum at the Atlanta Fed

 

May 15, 2017 in banks and banking, cards, debit cards, payments | Permalink

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May 8, 2017


Calculating Fraud: Part 1

When analyzing payments fraud rates, we have to consider what is being measured and compared. Should we measure fraud attempts that might have been thwarted—fraud that penetrated the system but might not necessarily have resulted in a loss—or fraud losses? Whatever the measure, it is important that the definition of what is included in the numerator and denominator be consistent to properly represent a fraud rate.

In calculating a fraud rate based on value or number, a fraud tally is needed in the numerator and a comparison payment tally in the denominator. The formula works out as follows:

Fraud Rate = Numerator
                     Denominator

Where, for any given period of time
Numerator = Value, or number of fraudulent payments across the payments under consideration,
Denominator = Value, or number of payments under consideration.

This post offers a process for tallying payments for the denominator. Part 2 of this series will focus on tallying the numerator, basing its approach on the process that the Federal Reserve Payments Study 2016 used. That process includes fraud that initially cleared and settled, not attempts, and does not exclude losses subsequently recovered.

The Fed’s 2016 payments study offers a method for whittling down all payment transactions to a subset of transactions suitable for calculating a fraud rate. Below is an extract, with clarifying commentary, from one of the study’s questionnaires, which asked card networks for both the value and number of payments.

Chart-one2

At first blush, totals for value or number under questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 could conceivably be used to provide a comparison tally for fraud. However, we should rule out the total from question 1 since the definition includes declined authorizations, making it unnecessarily broad. Question 2, "total authorized transactions," has the disadvantage of including pre-authorization only (authorized but not settled). While some of these transactions could have been initiated as part of a fraud attempt, they were never settled and consequently posed no opportunity for the fraudster to take off with ill-gotten gains. On balance, the preferred measure for payments is the result of question 3, which measures "net, authorized, and settled transactions." Unlike "net, purchased transactions" under question 4, this measure has the benefit of not excluding some of the fraud captured by chargebacks under question 3b.1. Other types of fraud are not covered under chargebacks, including when card issuers elect to absorb losses on low-value payments to avoid the costs of submitting a chargeback.

We could follow a similar process for tallying payments for ACH and checks, with adjustments to account for potential fraud resulting from the lack of an authorization system like that for cards, which requests authorization from the paying bank.

Part 2 of this series, which covers the process for calculating the numerator, will appear in June.

Photo of Steven Cordray  By Steven Cordray, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk  Forum at the Atlanta Fed

May 8, 2017 in ACH, checks, debit cards, fraud | Permalink

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February 27, 2017


Wouldn't It Be Nice to Tap and Pay?

In the mid-2000s, after setting up a new checking account following a move, I received a debit card that, in addition to the magnetic stripe, had contactless functionality. I remember thinking how "cool" this feature would be, not having to swipe the magnetic stripe but simply tapping the card on the point-of-sale (POS) terminal. However, I quickly became disappointed, as I couldn't use the tap functionality in most places that I shopped. In the few places that did allow for taps, I don't recall the tap ever working properly. After a few months, I never attempted to tap it again and reverted to the traditional swipe.

Fast forward to 2017, and contactless card usage is surging in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada while remaining all but nonexistent in the United States. In November 2016, contactless cards accounted for nearly 25 percent of all card payments in the United Kingdom, up from 11 percent since November 2015. In Australia, Visa reported that 75 percent of face-to-face transactions over their network happen via their contactless solution. And in Canada, 99 percent of Mastercard's consumer credit cards are contactless-enabled. A 2016 report found that Canadian consumers were frustrated by merchants that didn't accept contactless payments. All of these countries have also gone through a migration of their payments cards to EMV chip cards. Did the United States miss a great opportunity when chip cards replaced the magnetic-stripe-only payment cards?

Interestingly, in these markets where contactless card adoption rates are surging, contactless cards are leading the contactless payment push ahead of mobile payments. In the United States, we are heading in the opposite direction, with mobile contactless attempting, and struggling, to get traction. No doubt, mobile is the more challenging environment, with a variety of form factors (iPhone, GalaxyS7, Pixel, and more), different ways that the form factor can interact with the POS terminal (such as near-field communication, magnetic source transmission, and barcode), and a variety of different wallets compatible with the different form factors. With a contactless card, you get one form factor—a card—and one method of contactless interaction. (Multiple-interface cards can still be swiped or dipped at the POS.)

I am convinced that the investments made in mobile contactless to this point are one of several factors holding up this country's transition to a contactless card environment. Consumers are confused by the experience and merchants and issuers are struggling with the wide range of options to consider, such as which wallets to enable and which technologies to support. Contactless cards have the ability to create a ubiquitous experience for both consumers and merchants. And this writer believes that a payment experience can't get any easier than a tap of the card.

It's hard for me to believe that it has been 20 years since I received my keychain Speedpass fob. I have positive memories of the simple and seamless transactions that I experienced when purchasing gas by touching the contactless fob to the gas pump reader. Unfortunately, I moved to a location with very few stations that accepted my fob. I always wished that I could have a similar experience for other purchases. Contactless cards allow for that and in a much easier and simpler fashion than my mobile phone allows. So can we get on with contactless cards? I am ready to tap and pay everywhere. Are you?

Photo of Douglas King By Douglas A. King, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed

February 27, 2017 in chip-and-pin, contactless, debit cards, EMV, mobile payments | Permalink

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January 9, 2017


The Year in Review

As we move into 2017, the Take on Payments team would like to share its perspectives of major payment-related events and issues that took place in the United States in 2016, in no particular order of importance.

Cybersecurity Moves to Forefront—While cyber protection is certainly not new, the increased frequency and sophistication of cyber threats in 2016 accelerated the need for financial services enterprises, businesses, and governmental agencies to step up their external and internal defenses with more staff and better protection and detection tools. The federal government released a Cybersecurity National Action Plan and established the Federal Chief Information Security Office position to oversee governmental agencies' management of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure.

Same-Day ACH—Last September, NACHA's three-phase rules change took effect, mandating initially a credit-only same-day ACH service. It is uncertain this early whether NACHA will meet its expectations of same-day ACH garnering 1 percent of total ACH payment volume by October 2017. Anecdotally, we are hearing that some payments processors have been slow in supporting the service. Further clarity on the significance of same-day service will become evident with the addition of debit items in phase two, which takes effect this September.

Faster Payments—Maybe we're the only ones who see it this way, but in this country, "faster payments" looks like the Wild West—at least if you remember to say, "Howdy, pardner!" Word counts won't let us name or fully describe all of the various wagon trains racing for a faster payments land grab, but it seemed to start in October 2015 when The Clearing House announced it was teaming with FIS to deliver a real-time payment system for the United States. By March 2016, Jack Henry and Associates Inc. had joined the effort. Meanwhile, Early Warning completed its acquisition of clearXchange and announced a real-time offering in February. By August, this solution had been added to Fiserv's offerings. With Mastercard and Visa hovering around their own solutions and also attaching to any number of others, it seems like everybody is trying to make sure they don't get left behind.

Prepaid Card Account Rules—When it comes to compliance, "prepaid card" is now a misnomer based on the release of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's 2016 final ruling. The rule is access-device-agnostic, so the same requirements are applied to stored funds on a card, fob, or mobile phone app, to name a few. Prepaid accounts that are transactional and ready to use at a variety of merchants or ATMS, or for person-to-person, are now covered by Reg. E-Lite, and possibly Reg. Z, when overdraft or credit features apply. In industry speak, the rule applies to payroll cards, government benefit cards, PayPal-like accounts, and general-purpose reloadable cards—but not to gift cards, health or flexible savings accounts, corporate reimbursement cards, or disaster-relief-type accounts, for example.

Mobile Payments Move at Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary, Pace—While the Apple, Google, and Samsung Pay wallets continued to move forward with increasing financial institution and merchant participation, consumer usage remained anemic. With the retailer consortium wallet venture MCX going into hibernation, a number of major retailers announced or introduced closed-loop mobile wallet programs hoping to emulate the success of retailers such as Starbucks and Dunkin' Brands. The magic formula of payments, loyalty, and couponing interwoven into a single application remains elusive.

EMV Migration—The migration to chip cards and terminals in the United States continued with chip cards now representing approximately 70 percent of credit/debit cards in the United States. Merchant adoption of chip-enabled terminals stands just below 40 percent of the market. The ATM liability shift for Mastercard payment cards took effect October 21, with only an estimated 30 percent of non-FI-owned ATMs being EMV operational. Recognizing some of the unique challenges to the gasoline retailers, the brands pushed back the liability shift timetable for automated fuel dispensers three years, to October 2020. Chip card migration has clearly reduced counterfeit card fraud, but card-not-present (CNP) fraud has ballooned. Data for 2015 from the 2016 Federal Reserve Payments Study show card fraud by channel in the United States at 54 percent for in person and 46 percent for remote (or CNP). This is in contrast to comparable fraud data in other countries further along in EMV implementation, where remote fraud accounts for the majority of card fraud.

Distributed Ledger—Although venture capital funding in blockchain and distributed ledger startups significantly decreased in 2016 from 2015, interest remains high. Rather than investing in startups, financial institutions and established technology companies, such as IBM, shifted their funding focus to developing internal solutions and their technology focus from consumer-facing use cases such as Bitcoin to back-end clearing and settlement solutions and the execution of smart contracts.

Same Song, Same Verse—Some things just don't seem to change from year to year. Notifications of data breaches of financial institutions, businesses, and governmental agencies appear to have been as numerous as in previous years. The Fed's Consumer Payment Choices study continued to show that cash remains the most frequent payment method, especially for transactions under 10 dollars.

All of us at the Retail Payments Risk Forum wish all our Take On Payments readers a prosperous 2017.

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Mary Kepler
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Julius Weyman
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Doug King
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Dave Lott
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Steven Cordray

 

January 9, 2017 in ACH, ATM fraud, cards, chip-and-pin, cybercrime, debit cards, emerging payments, EMV, fraud, mobile banking, mobile payments, P2P, prepaid, regulations | Permalink

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